Is it possible that I desire more intensely to act according to my second best judgment than I desire to act according to my leading one, at the very same instance? Is this (hypothetical) incoherence recognizable in our ordinary moral deliberations? If yes, it is worth adjusting our intuitions and philosophical insight so that such incoherence is seen to fall in some place it deserves between the moral and the rational…
Between the Moral and the Rational
Essays on Meta-ethics: Moral Beliefs, Values and Desires, Moral Motivation, Rationality and Moral coherence
ISBN | 978-960-02-2195-4 |
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Σελίδες | 268 |
Έτος πρώτης έκδοσης | 2008 |
Έτος τρέχουσας έκδοσης | 2008 |
Βάρος (g) | 360 |
Σχήμα | 21 x 14 |
16,96€
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